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         ABSTRACT OF THESIS 
 
       A TRUSTED STORAGE SYSTEM FOR THE CLOUD 
 
Data stored in third party storage systems like the cloud might not be secure since 
confidentiality and integrity of data are not guaranteed. Though cloud computing 
provides cost-effective storage services, it is a third party service and so, a client cannot 
trust the cloud service provider to store its data securely within the cloud. Hence, many 
organizations and users may not be willing to use the cloud services to store their data 
in the cloud until certain security guarantees are made. In this thesis, a solution to the 
problem of securely storing the client’s data by maintaining the confidentiality and 
integrity of the data within the cloud is developed. Five protocols are developed which 
ensure that the client’s data is stored only on trusted storage servers, replicated only on 
trusted storage servers, and guarantee that the data owners and other privileged users 
of that data access the data securely. The system is based on trusted computing 
platform technology [11]. It uses a Trusted Platform Module, specified by the Trusted 
Computing Group [11]. An encrypted file system is used to encrypt the user’s data. The 
system provides data security against a system administrator in the cloud. 
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
In this thesis, a framework/system for trusted storage of a client’s data within the cloud 
is developed. The proposed system is called ‘A Trusted Storage System for the Cloud’. As 
an enormous quantity of electronic data is being generated, there is a requirement of 
vast storage systems which can hold that data. The requirement is not just storing the 
data but storing it securely, i.e., the confidentiality and integrity of the data should be 
maintained. The question of confidentiality and integrity of data comes into the picture 
when the owner’s data is being stored in third party storage systems like the cloud. 
National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) defines cloud computing as 
follows: “Cloud computing is a model for enabling convenient, on-demand network 
access to a shared pool of configurable computing resources (e.g., networks, servers, 
storage, applications, and services) that can be rapidly provisioned and released with 
minimal management effort or service provider interaction” [10]. Though cloud 
computing provides cost-effective storage services, it is a third party service and 
therefore, a user/client cannot trust the cloud service provider to store its data securely 
within the cloud. Hence, many organizations and users may not be willing to use the 
cloud services to store their data in the cloud until certain security guarantees are made.  
1.1 Problem Statement 
Unencrypted data of the client cannot be stored in the cloud because the cloud provider 
will have access to the data and hence the confidentiality of the data will be lost. Also, a 
malicious cloud provider (system administrator) can modify the client’s data and hence, 
the integrity of the data will be lost. To achieve confidentiality and integrity of the data, 
cryptographic techniques can be used to encrypt data. Encrypted file systems (EFS) can 
be used to encrypt the client’s data within the cloud.  An encrypted file system is used 
to encrypt the user’s data, manage and create keys which are used for data encryption 
and decryption [8]. The encryption and decryption of files is transparent to the user and 
the application [8]. The EFS provides a convenient way to encrypt and decrypt data since 
encryption, decryption and storage of data is automatic and it performs key 
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management and key creation functions. Encrypted file systems are implemented in the 
kernel of the operating system. The keys used for encryption and decryption are stored 
in disk and are encrypted with the public key of the data owner (user of the computer). 
The encrypted key is decrypted with the user’s private key. Encrypted file systems work 
well when they are used in personal computers. If they are used in third party 
organizations like the cloud to protect a client’s data, there would be data security 
breaches. This is because the encryption keys used to encrypt data are stored in the disk 
and even when the encryption keys are encrypted, they are encrypted using the public 
key of the user of that storage node. The user of the storage node in the cloud is the 
system administrator who has the maximum privileges on that storage server. Thus, he 
could easily get hold of the encryption/decryption keys of the encrypted file system 
stored in the disk and thereby decrypt the client’s data and can even modify it. Hence 
the confidentiality and integrity of the client’s data might be lost. Loss of data 
confidentiality and integrity is undesirable for a client. They are the two main security 
issues for a client who is using the cloud services to store his data.  
To enable a client to establish trust in the cloud provider’s ability to securely store his 
data within the cloud, we need a solution to achieve confidentiality and integrity of 
client’s data within the cloud. 
In this thesis, a solution to the problem of securely storing the client’s data by 
maintaining the confidentiality and integrity of the data within the cloud is developed. 
The proposed system is called ‘A Trusted Storage System for Cloud’. The system is based 
on trusted computing platform technology [11]. It uses a Trusted Platform Module 
(TPM), specified by the Trusted Computing Group [11], in every storage node of the 
cloud to build a trusted storage cloud. The TPM is a chip installed on the motherboard 
of a computer, that performs basic cryptographic functions like encryption of secret 
data like encryption/decryption keys, hashing data, storing platform state among 
others. It also stores the encrypted data within itself. In the proposed system, the TPM 
is used for remote attestation and EFS key storage. Storing the EFS keys within the TPM 
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provides security of keys against the system administrator. The TPM achieves secure 
data storage by encrypting the data using its public key, and the corresponding private 
key that is used for decryption is known only to the TPM. Remote attestation involves a 
remote entity authenticating the platform of a storage node, i.e., checking whether the 
platform is what it claims to be.  When the client sends a request to retrieve his data, 
the EFS has to decrypt the data to send it back to the client. The TPM which has the EFS 
encryption/decryption keys stored within it, passes on the corresponding keys to the 
kernel for decryption when requested by the kernel, only after verifying if the platform 
of the storage node is as expected. The EFS then decrypts the data with these keys. Data 
decryption is done in the memory. A fraud system administrator can install a malicious 
code in the kernel to access the memory while the data is being decrypted and hence, 
he can obtain the keys as well as the decrypted data while they are in the memory. The 
TPM prevents this undesired memory access by comparing the current platform state 
with the expected platform state (stored in the TPM), and only when they match does 
the TPM pass on the decryption keys to the kernel. All the storage nodes within the 
cloud are attested by a trusted third party node. Attestation is required to ensure safer 
computing in all environments. Five protocols have been proposed to solve the problem 
of data confidentiality and integrity. 
1.2 Contributions of the Thesis 
In the thesis, a solution to the data confidentiality and integrity problem within the 
cloud is provided by developing a Trusted Storage System for the Cloud. The Trusted 
Storage System consists of trusted storage servers, a front-end server and a trusted 
third party node (TTPN) that is maintained by a trusted third party. The TTPN checks the 
correctness of the platform of a storage server, i.e., it remotely attests to the storage 
server. After attesting to the storage server, the server is deemed trusted and hence it 
can be used to store the client’s data securely.  A client communicates with the cloud 
through the front-end server and vice-versa. 
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Five protocols are developed to solve the following problems: 
 How a storage node joins the Trusted Storage System in a cloud and hence, 
becomes trusted. 
 How a client can store his data securely on ‘trusted’ storage nodes. 
 How a trusted storage node becomes ready to accept data for replication. 
 How a trusted storage node sends the data for replication to other ‘trusted’ 
storage nodes. 










 5                                                                              
Chapter 2: Background and Related Work 
 
2.1 Background 
2.1.1 Cloud Computing 
National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) defines cloud computing as “A 
model for enabling convenient, on-demand network access to a shared pool of 
configurable computing resources (e.g., networks, servers, storage, applications, and 
services) that can be rapidly provisioned and released with minimal management effort 
or service provider interaction” [10]. Cloud computing is a developing technology that 
enables the IT industry to minimize computing costs by providing services that are 
charged on usage basis. The cloud users pay as they go, i.e., they pay for the services 
they use on demand. It is just like paying the monthly electricity bill, i.e., paying just for 
the electricity used. Therefore, Cloud Computing is also known as utility computing. 
The term ‘Cloud’ is taken from the symbol used to represent the internet. The cloud 
denotes a collection of servers and computers that can be accessed by the public 
through the internet. These servers and computers are owned and operated by a third 
party in multiple data center locations. These machines can run any number of 
operating systems. Cloud computing delivers hosted services to the clients over the 
internet [5]. 
 
The services provided by the cloud are divided into three main categories: IaaS 
(Infrastructure as a Service), PaaS (Platform as a Service), and SaaS (Software as a 
Service). 
IaaS (Infrastructure as a Service): The cloud provider provides virtual server instances to 
the clients. The clients can configure the virtual servers and the storage assigned to 
them [5].       
Example: Amazon’s EC2. 
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PaaS (Platform as a Service): The cloud provider allows clients to build their 
software/applications on the provider’s platform over the internet. The platform is 
nothing but the software and product development tools [5].  
Examples: Google Apps Engine and Microsoft’s Azure Cloud Platform.  
SaaS (Software as a Service): The cloud provider provides software applications to the 
client and allows him to use them for as long as he needs [5]. 
Examples: Salesforce.com, Gmail and MapQuest. 
Types of clouds: 
1. Public Cloud  
2. Private Cloud 
Public Cloud: It is the cloud that is available to anyone who can access the internet. 
Private Cloud: It is the cloud that is available only to a group of people who belong to an 
organization. 
 
2.1.1.1 Cloud Architecture 
 
                         Figure 2.1: Architecture of a Cloud Computing System [6]. 
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The user interacts with the front-end interface from which he selects a service, for 
example, to store his files, to access a document, or to run an application [6]. The user’s 
request is transferred to the System Management which finds the appropriate resources 
to be assigned, and calls upon the Provisioning Services mechanism to provision the 
resources to the user [6]. The Provisioning Services mechanism contacts the cloud 
servers and processes the user’s request [6]. After processing the user’s request, the 
cloud system monitor tracks the usage of resources by the user and records it in his 
profile [6]. Thus, the cloud provider charges the user according to his cloud usage. 
All of these management tasks are automated in the cloud computing system [6]. 
 
2.1.1.2 Cloud Storage 
The user’s data is stored in multiple servers of the cloud rather than on a dedicated 
server like in the traditional data center storage [6]. To the user, it appears as if his data 
is stored in a particular location but in fact, the data might move from one location to 
another in time.  
 
Cloud Storage System Architecture: 
 
Figure 2.2: Cloud Storage System Architecture. 
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Figure 2.2 depicts the architecture of a cloud storage system. The cloud consists of 
several storage servers and a front-end server/node manager which manages the 
storage servers within the cloud. A client communicates with the cloud through the 
front-end server and vice-versa. The client uses a web-based interface to communicate 
with the front-end server of the cloud. The client sends his data/files via the internet to 
the cloud for storage. The front-end server after receiving the client’s files chooses a 
storage server within the cloud and sends the client’s files to it.  
The Client’s data is replicated within the cloud storage servers for reliability. A storage 
server sends copies of its data to other storage servers of the cloud.  
2.1.2 Encrypted File Systems 
An Encrypted File System is used to encrypt files stored in the file system. Encryption by 
an encrypted file system does not occur at the application level but it occurs at the file 
system level [8]. Hence, the encryption/decryption procedures are transparent to the 
user and to the applications. Encrypted file systems provide an easy way to encrypt data 
by doing this automatically for users, so they do not need to encrypt their data using 
cryptographic techniques and to manage keys. 
                               
Figure 2.3: Example of flow of an encryption process in an Encrypting File system 
(Microsoft Windows). (taken from [9]) 
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Figure 2.3 depicts the flow of encryption process in the Encrypting File System (EFS) of 
Microsoft Windows. The application passes on data that needs to be encrypted to the 
NTFS file system driver. The NTFS then passes on this data to the cache manager which 
writes the data to disk through NTFS. The NTFS then contacts the EFS driver to encrypt 
the data. The EFS driver encrypts the received data using its keys and returns the 
encrypted data along with its associated encryption/decryption keys to the NTFS. The 
NTFS writes the encrypted data and the associated keys to the disk. 
File encryption key (FEK) for each file is generated by the EFS. This is a symmetric 
cryptographic key used for data encryption. The FEK is encrypted using the user’s public 
key. The EFS uses the corresponding private key of the user to decrypt the encrypted 
FEK. The private key of the user is known only to the EFS and the user, thus providing 
security for the FEK.  
2.1.3 Trusted Platform Module                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                       
2.1.3.1 What is a TPM? 
The Trusted Platform Module (TPM) is a computer microchip or a microcontroller which 
is designed to perform various security-related and cryptographic functions. It can 
securely store the artifacts used to authenticate the platform of a computer. The 
artifacts can include encryption keys, certificates, passwords, and integrity metrics of a 
platform. The TPM can be used in the process of remote attestation of a platform of a 
machine which will be discussed further later. It is typically installed on the 
motherboard of a computer. The TPM uses a hardware bus to communicate with the 
rest of the system. 
The TPM is a specification or implementation of that specification as a chip. The 
specification is provided by the Trusted Computing Group [11]. 
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2.1.3.2 The Trusted Computing Group (TCG) 
The Trusted Computing Group (TCG) is a non-profit international industry standards 
group which develops, defines and promotes open standards for trusted computing that 
is beneficial to the users [2]. The TCG develops specifications and publishes them for use 
and implementation by the industry.  Experts from various technologies work together 
for developing the specifications. Anyone can join or become members of the TCG 
including non-profit corporations and for-profit corporations and use their specifications 
for implementation. 
The TCG has several work groups which work on different areas. The work groups 
include: Authentication, Hardcopy, Infrastructure, Mobile Phone, PC Client, Server 
Specific, Storage, Trusted Network Connect, Trusted Platform Module, TCG Software 
Stack, and Virtualized Platform. In our problem, we use the Trusted Platform Module.  
2.1.3.3  Architecture of the TPM 
 
     Figure 2.4: Component Architecture of a TPM (taken from [4]) 
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Input and Output (I/O) 
The Input and Output component of the TPM controls the information flow through the 
communication bus [4]. It sends the received messages to the appropriate components 
in the TPM. 
Cryptographic Co-Processor 
The Cryptographic Co-Processor performs cryptographic functions within the TPM. The 
functions include Asymmetric Key Generation (RSA), Asymmetric Encryption/Decryption 
(RSA), Hashing (SHA-1), and Random Number Generation (RNG) [4]. 
These functions are used for encrypting data, generating keys, random numbers, and 
generating hash of data. 
Key Generation 
The Key Generation Component generates RSA key pairs and symmetric keys [4]. 
HMAC Engine 
The HMAC engine generates two proofs. One is proof of knowledge of authentication 
data provided by the user and the other is the proof that the request received by the 
TPM is authorized and no changes have been made to the command in transit [4]. 
Random Number Generator 
The Random Number Generator generates random values which are used as nonces, 
used for key generation and obtaining randomness in signatures [4].  
SHA-1 Engine 
The SHA-1 Engine consists of the SHA-1 algorithm whose interface is exposed outside 
the TPM to support platform measurement taking during the boot time of the machine 
[4]. 
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Power Detection 
The Power Detection Component manages the power states of the TPM in accordance 
with the power states of the platform [4]. 
 
Opt-In 
The Opt-In component provides mechanisms to turn-on and turn-off, enable and 
disable, and activate and deactivate the TPM [4]. 
Execution Engine 
The Execution Engine executes the TPM commands received from the I/O port [4]. 
Non-Volatile Memory 
The Non-Volatile Memory is used for storing persistent identity and state associated 
with the TPM [4]. It can also be used to store data created by entities authorized by the 
TPM owner [4].  
2.1.3.4 Platform Integrity Measurements 
Platform integrity measurements or integrity metrics are the measurements reflecting 
the integrity of the software state of the platform of a machine [1], for example, the 
hash of the kernel, sequence of hashes of the software involved in the boot sequence of 
the machine. These integrity metrics must be reliably measured, stored and reported to 
a challenger who requests for the platform state of the machine so that the challenger 
can determine if the platform is in an expected state.  
There must be two roots of trust in a trusted platform namely, “root of trust for 
measuring integrity metrics” and “root of trust for storing and reporting integrity 
metrics” [1]. A trusted measurement root measures certain platform characteristics, 
logs the measured data in a measurement store present in the platform, and stores the 
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final result in a TPM [1]. The trusted measurement root may also measure 
characteristics of another measurement agent before passing on control to it. In the 
same way, this second measurement agent may also measure the characteristics of 
another measurement agent, log the measured data, store the final result in a TPM, and 
then pass on control to a third measurement agent and so on [1]. For instance, the BIOS 
stores its own measurements in the TPM and then the BIOS measures the boot loader 
and logs the measured data in the measurement store and stores it in the TPM. The 
boot loader now measures the operating system and logs the measured data in the 
measurement store and stores it in the TPM.  
The measured data stored in the measurement store is called “measurement list”, ML.  
2.1.3.5 Platform Configuration Register (PCR)  
There is a register called platform configuration register (PCR) within the TPM in a 
shielded location which is used to store the platform integrity metrics. There are a 
minimum of 16 platform configuration registers in the TPM. The platform integrity 
measurements made at the initial state (boot time) of the computer are stored in the 
PCRs. The root of trust for storing and reporting integrity metrics which is in the TPM is 
responsible for storing and reporting the integrity metrics of the platform in the PCR 
registers. 
Integrity metrics may keep changing in time. So, updated integrity metrics must exist 
within the PCR. It is difficult to authenticate the source of measurement of integrity 
metrics. Hence each new integrity metric is not allowed to overwrite the existing 
integrity metric [4]. The old values and the new values should be stored separately. For 
this to happen, an indefinite amount of memory must exist. The PCR registers are 
designed in such a way that they can hold an unlimited number of measurements [4]. 
The PCR uses a hash function to achieve this. 
A pseudo code representing how a PCR stores the measurements [4]: 
“PCRi New = HASH (PCRi Old value || value to add)”  
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2.1.3.6 Trusting a TPM 
The TPM has an Endorsement Key pair (private and public keys). The Endorsement 
private key uniquely identifies the TPM and is not exposed outside the TPM [4]. The 
Endorsement key is generated by the manufacturer at the time of TPM manufacture. 
The endorsement public key is signed by the manufacturer to guarantee the correctness 
of the chip and validity of the key. This is published as an Endorsement Certificate. The 
Endorsement Certificate certifies that the Endorsement Key is unique and is protected 
within the TPM at all times. An endorsement key is not used for signing any content 
which travels outside the TPM due to privacy concerns.  There is an attestation identity 
key, AIK, generated in the TPM which is an alias for the endorsement key [4]. The AIK is 
an asymmetric key pair. The private portion of the AIK is protected by the TPM and is 
never exposed outside the TPM. The AIK is a signature key and is not used for 
encryption.  It only signs data generated internally by the TPM. The AIK is used to sign 
the Platform Configuration Register (PCR) values of the TPM during the platform 
attestation process which is discussed in section 2.1.3.7. When the TPM signs the 
platform state stored in the PCRs using the private attestation identity key and sends it 
to a remote party challenging the TPM, the remote party retrieves the attestation 
identity key certificate from a certification authority and decrypts the signature of the 
TPM. Hence the remote party trusts the TPM and believes that the data is prepared by 
the TPM.  
2.1.3.7 Remote Attestation 
Attestation is the process of authenticating a platform running in a machine by checking 
if the platform is in an expected genuine state. Remote attestation is the attestation 
done by an entity/ challenger which is remote. When a challenger requests a machine to 
provide its platform state, the TPM of the machine signs the PCR values (made at boot 
time) stored within it with the TPM’s private attestation identity key, pri(AIK). The 
machine sends the challenger the measurement list, ML, stored in its measurement 
store, along with the TPM’s signed PCR values. The challenger decrypts the signed PCR 
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values of the TPM with the public attestation identity key, pub(AIK), of the TPM. Since 
pri(AIK) is known only to the TPM, the challenger is assured that the PCR values have not 
been modified by the machine or an attacker after successful decryption of the signed 
content by the challenger. The challenger compares the received measurement list, ML, 
with the PCR values of the TPM. If they are not the same, the challenger understands 
that the measurement list has been modified by the machine which happens when the 
machine is compromised and thus, the attestation fails. If they are the same, the 
challenger trusts the measurement list to be the actual measurements of the platform 
running in the machine. The challenger has the expected measurement/state of the 
platform stored within it. The challenger now compares the received measurement list, 
ML, with the expected measurements stored within it. If they are the same, the 
challenger attests to the platform running in the machine. The remote party now trusts 
the machine (platform) which is using that TPM and can now perform confidential 
transactions with that machine. If they are not the same, the attestation fails. 
2.2 Related Work 
He and Xu [7] propose a scheme to protect data on a personal computer platform. They 
use the trusted computing platform developed by the trusted computing group (TCG) to 
develop a secure and reliable model for user authentication and data encryption. Their 
model uses a storage protocol to encrypt data and uses Trusted Platform Module (TPM) 
to authenticate different users of the PC. The host computer has the trusted computing 
platform installed within itself, i.e., it has TPM installed in it. First, a trusted connection 
is established between the host computer and the storage device, i.e., the host and the 
storage device authenticate each other before any data storage takes place within the 
storage device and before data is accessed from the storage device by the host. Then, 
security control is provided by storing access control policies within the storage device. 
The access control policies apply to users, devices and applications. Message control 
between the host and the storage device is provided by implementing session-oriented 
secure data transmission. 
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Sailor, Doorn and Ward [12] describe a trusted computing platform which extends the 
hardware-rooted trust guarantees of TCG (Trusted Computing Group) technologies to 
the operating system and all its applications and allows remote parties to check the 
trust guarantees. The TCG defines standards for measuring and reporting integrity 
metrics at the system boot time. However, the TCG does not provide information on the 
trustworthiness of the runtime of the operating system. Sailor et al. [12] provide a 
solution to this problem. They give a procedure that explains how a challenging party 
can attest to the software stack of an untrusted machine. Trust is established between 
two parties after mutual attestation takes place. The kernel of the attested system 
(system that needs to be attested) is instrumented to generate measurements of post-
boot events which affect the run-time of the system. The components of the software 
stack that have semantic value are measured. The measured components are kernel 
modules, executables and shared libraries, configuration files and other important input 
files that affect trust into the run-time software stack. The measurements are done as 
soon as executable content is loaded into the system and before it is executed. The 
attested system creates and stores a measurement list which is a list of hashes of the 
software stack components. This list is also stored in the TPM (Trusted Platform 
Module) for achieving integrity. The measured list and the list stored in the TPM are 
sent to the challenging party. The challenging party compares the two of them and 
trusts the measurement list of the attested system if both turn out to be the same. After 
that, the challenging party compares the received measurement list with its stored 
expected list of measurements. If the two turn out to be the same, the challenging party 
attests to the system and hence the challenging party is assured that the system is 
running the expected software stack. 
Santos, Gummadi and Rodrigues [13] propose the design of a trusted cloud computing 
platform (TCCP) which enables the ‘infrastructure as a service’ providers to provide a 
closed box execution environment that guarantees confidential execution of a client’s 
virtual machines. Before launching their virtual machines, the clients can attest to the 
service provider to determine whether or not the service provided is secure. Each node 
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in the cloud runs a Trusted Virtual Machine Monitor (TVMM) that hosts the client’s 
virtual machines and prevents privileged users from inspecting or modifying them. Each 
node in the cloud embeds a TPM to enable secure booting and for attestation. Santos et 
al. propose TCCP protocols to securely launch virtual machine of a client on a machine in 
the cloud and migrate it safely to other machines in the cloud. The TVMM guarantees 
that a virtual machine is launched on a trusted machine in the cloud and that the system 
administrator will not be able to inspect or tamper with the initial state of the virtual 
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Chapter 3: Proposed Trusted Storage System for the Cloud 
A client/user stores his data within the cloud storage servers. Since cloud is a third party 
system, it cannot be trusted. We consider the confidentiality and integrity issues of 
client’s data within the cloud and provide a solution to these issues by proposing a 
framework/system called a Trusted Storage System for Cloud. The system provides data 
security against the cloud provider, especially against the system administrator who has 
the maximum number of privileges over the storage nodes in the cloud. 
3.1 System Architecture 
The proposed system consists of the following entities: 
 User/Client 
 Trusted Third Party Node (TTPN) 
 Front-End Server (FES)  
 Group of Storage Servers/Nodes 
User/Client 
The User/Client is the entity that uses the cloud to store its data. It trusts the Trusted 
Third Party Node (TTPN) only.  
Trusted Third Party Node (TTPN) 
The TTPN is an entity maintained by a trusted third party and does not belong to the 
cloud. It is the integral entity of the Trusted Storage System. It checks each 
node/storage server in the cloud for correctness of platform and attests to it. After 
attestation by the TTPN, a node is deemed trusted and can then store the user’s data 
within itself.  
Front-End Server (FES) 
The Front-End Server is an entity which forwards the messages it receives from the 
entities of the system (like the users, TTPN, storage servers) to other entities in the 
system. The FES maintains a directory which contains information about the location of 
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each client’s data, i.e., in which storage node within the cloud each client’s data is 
stored.  
Group of Storage Servers/Nodes 
The Storage Servers/Nodes are the entities which are within the cloud and they store 
the user’s data. They are attested by the TTPN so that they can store the user’s data 
safely. Every storage node has a TPM installed in it. 
The cloud storage servers use an encrypted file system for encrypting the data of the 
clients. We assume that the key creation and management is done by the encrypted file 
system and it takes care of the encryption and decryption of data and storage within the 
storage server. If the user encrypts his data with his keys, he should reveal his keys to 
the other users with whom he wants to share his data so that they decrypt the data 
using his keys. Revealing user’s encryption/decryption keys is not desirable.  
The TTPN sends the user a one-time symmetric key to encrypt his data with before 
storing his data in the cloud for data confidentiality so that the user need not create or 
manage encryption keys. After the cloud receives the client’s encrypted data, it decrypts 
the data which is being encrypted with the one-time symmetric key and then, the 
encrypted file system re-encrypts the data with its own keys which are more secure. The 
user just needs to create a user key, which the TTPN and the storage nodes use for 
secure communication with the user.  
3.2 Role of the TPM in the system 
3.2.1 Remote Attestation 
A remote node can attest to the storage node in the cloud with the help of TPM 
installed in the storage node. To attest to a storage node is to certify that the node is 
trustworthy and can henceforth be used for storage. Trustworthiness of a node means 
the platform of the node is in an expected secure state and that it is not being modified 
for malicious actions. 
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The remote node in the proposed system is the Trusted Third Party Node (TTPN) which 
authenticates the platform of the storage node and then attests to the storage node.  
Why do a platform authentication? 
There must be a method to check whether the platform is in a state which it claims to 
be in. This is called platform authentication. A malicious system administrator in the 
cloud can run a malicious program within the kernel, for instance, to read the memory 
during data decryption. Hence he will be able to obtain the decrypted data as well as 
the keys used during decryption in memory. In order to avoid such attacks by privileged 
users like the system administrator, the platform needs to be checked during the 
system/node boot time if it is in the expected state, i.e., no malicious program is 
installed in the platform. The system administrator should reboot the node in order to 
successfully install a malicious program in the kernel. Therefore, whenever a node 
reboots, platform authentication must be performed. 
Platform authentication and storage node attestation is explained in section 3.3 in 
protocol 1. 
3.2.2 Protected Storage of Encryption Keys 
The TPM stores the keys (secret data) of the encrypted file system which are used for 
encryption of client’s data. The encrypted file system, after encryption of the client’s 
data, transfers the keys to the TPM for secure storage. The secret data (keys) is 
encrypted using a key known only to the TPM.  So, only the TPM can decrypt the secret 
data stored in it using its key.  
There is a key hierarchy for all the keys which are used for protected storage within the 
TPM [3]. The root key for this hierarchy is called Storage Root Key (SRK). Each of the 
keys in the hierarchy is encrypted with the key above it in the hierarchy. Key blobs and 
data blobs are formed as a result of the encryption of keys and the data. Figure 3.1 
depicts key storage within the TPM. FEK is the file encryption key used to encrypt files. 
The keys are represented as data in the figure. Each file encryption key is encrypted with 
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a TPM key which is again encrypted with another key in the hierarchy and so on. The 
root key used is called Storage Root Key (SRK) [1]. RSA encryption algorithm is used for 
key/data encryption. The encrypted data is called data blob and the encrypted key 
hierarchy is called key blob. The Storage Root Key is known only to the TPM and is not 
exposed outside TPM [1]. Hence, the keys stored within the TPM are secure. 
The size of the keys which are going to be stored in the TPM cannot be bigger than the 
size of the keys of the TPM which are used to encrypt them [1]. If the key used for file 
encryption is small, the encryption of that key is performed within the TPM chip using 
its RSA engine [3]. If the key is large, the encryption of the key can be done in either of 
the following ways: 
1. The platform itself can encrypt the key using a one-time symmetric key of small 
size. And that symmetric key can be stored in the TPM safely [3]. 
2. The platform can divide the key into smaller blocks and then send these blocks 
to the TPM for encryption of each block separately. The platform is responsible 
for reassembling the blocks when the key is retrieved from the TPM [3]. 
                
                  Figure 3.1: Key Storage within the TPM. (taken from [3]) 
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Secure access to keys: 
When the kernel requests the TPM for access of EFS keys for data decryption, the TPM 
decrypts those keys and passes them on to the kernel when it believes that the platform 
on that node is trustworthy, i.e., the platform is in the expected state. First, the TPM 
verifies if the TTPN has attested to the storage node. If the storage node has been 
attested by the TTPN, the current platform state is compared with the expected genuine 
platform state stored in the PCRs of the TPM. If they are not the same, the TPM does 
not pass on the requested keys to the platform. If they are the same, the TPM passes on 
the keys to the platform.  
3.3 Joining of a storage node in the Trusted Storage System of the Cloud 
 
      Figure 3.2: Joining of a storage node in the Trusted Storage System of the Cloud. 
 
A storage node in the cloud must join the Trusted Storage System before it can store a 
client’s data. The TTPN tests if a TPM is being installed on the storage node and if 
installed, it checks for the correctness of the platform of the storage node.  This process 
 23                                                                              
is called attestation. After successful attestation of the platform of the storage node by 
the TTPN, the storage node is deemed trusted and can store a client’s data securely. 
Notations 
nTTPN: Nonce of the TTPN 
PCRVN:  The PCR value stored in the TPM of node N (Hash of the kernel of the node and 
sequence of hashes of the software involved in the boot sequence of the node - 
bootstrap loader, BIOS) 
MLN:  Measurement list of the node N 
pri(AIK):   Private attestation identity key of the TPM of node N 
pub(AIK): Public attestation identity key of the TPM of node N 
C(AIK): Attestation identity key certificate of the TPM of node N 
pub(N): Public key of the node N 
Nid: ID of the node N 
pub(TTPN): Public key of the TTPN 
pri(TTPN): Private key of the TTPN 
 
Protocol 1 
Message 1: {“Join System”, Nid} 
Message 2: {“Send platform state”, nTTPN} pri(TTPN) 
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A storage node N sends message 1, a “Join System” message which includes its ID, to 
the Trusted Third Party Node (TTPN). The TTPN in response, sends message 2 which 
contains a nonce (a one-time large random number) to the storage node, N, as a 
challenge to prevent replay attacks. The TTPN signs message 2 with its private key, 
pri(TTPN). 
The node N prepares a measurement list ML which contains the hash of the kernel and 
sequence of hashes of the software involved in the boot sequence of the node – 
bootstrap loader and BIOS at the boot time. The node stores this measurement list in a 
measurement store within it. This measured list is also stored in the PCR registers of the 
TPM. When the storage node N receives message 2 from the TTPN, the TPM of that 
node signs the stored PCR value, PCRVN, and the received nonce of the TTPN, nTTPN, with 
its private attestation identity key, pri(AIK). Since the private attestation identity key, 
pri(AIK), is known only to the TPM, the signature assures that the content is prepared by 
the TPM only. The TPM passes on this signed content to the storage node along with the 
public attestation identity key, pub(AIK), and the attestation identity key certificate, 
C(AIK). The storage node prepares message 3 which contains the content received from 
the TPM and the measurement list, ML, and the public key of the node N, pub(N). The 
node creates a private key, pri(N), corresponding to the public key, pub(N), so that it can 
use this pair of keys in further communications with the TTPN and the client. The private 
key is stored in the memory of the node and is not saved anywhere. The key pair 
denotes the identity of the storage node. Message 3 is encrypted with the public key of 
the TTPN to achieve confidentiality of the message.  
When the TTPN receives message 3, it decrypts the message using its private key, 
pri(TTPN). It first views the attestation identity key certificate, C(AIK), and then trusts the 
public attestation identity key of the TPM, pub(AIK). It uses pub(AIK) to decrypt the 
following: {PCRVN , nTTPN} pri(AIK).  After a successful decryption with the public attestation 
identity key of the TPM, pub(AIK), the TTPN is assured that a TPM is being installed in 
that storage node and that the received content is being prepared by the TPM. The 
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TTPN retrieves the PCR value, PCRVN, and the nonce, nTTPN. It compares the received PCR 
value with the received measurement list, MLN, of the storage node N. If the values do 
not match, the TTPN comes to know that the measurement list has been changed and 
the attestation fails. If the TTPN finds that both the values are equal, it trusts the 
measurement list, MLN, of the node N to be a genuine measurement of the current 
platform of the node N. The TTPN compares this measurement list with the expected 
state of the platform stored within itself. If the values do not match, the attestation 
fails. If the TTPN finds the values to be the same, it trusts that the platform of the 
storage node N has not been changed or tampered and hence attests to the storage 
node N. The TTPN then stores the public key of the node along with its ID in its 
database.  
The private key of the storage node, pri(N), is stored in the memory of the storage node. 
So, when the node reboots, the private key is lost and hence a compromised node 
cannot use the same public and private key pair to communicate with the TTPN. Hence, 
the storage node must rejoin (by repeating this protocol) the trusted storage system if it 
gets rebooted.  
The TTPN now attests to the storage node by sending a “joined” message encrypted 
with its private key, pri(TTPN), conveying the node that it has been accepted as part of 
the Trusted Storage System of the Cloud. The storage node N is now deemed “trusted”. 
It can now securely store a client’s data. 
Correctness 
We show that only storage nodes with the expected platform state join the trusted 
storage system. 
A storage node prepares a measurement list, MLN, which denotes the measurement of 
the current state of the system at boot time. The measured state of the system is 
securely stored in the TPM of the storage node for maintaining the integrity of the 
measured state. The TTPN has the expected state of the platform stored in it. When a 
 26                                                                              
TTPN receives a “join system” request from the storage node, it sends a “send platform 
state” request to the storage node. In return, the storage node sends the measurement 
list, MLN, and the platform state, PCRVN, stored in the PCR registers of the TPM which is 
signed by the TPM. The TTPN trusts the signed content of the TPM after viewing the 
attestation identity key certificate which is signed by a certification authority. 
There is a possibility that a malicious/ compromised node can modify the measurement 
list, MLN, to represent a genuine platform state. The TTPN compares the signed PCR 
value, PCRVN, with the measurement list, MLN, of the node. If they are different, the 
TTPN does not attest to the storage node. The attestation fails. If they are equal, it 
trusts the measurement list, MLN, of the node. The TTPN now compares the 
measurement list, MLN, with the expected state stored within it. If they are different, 
the attestation fails. If they are equal, the TTPN trusts the platform running on the 
storage node and hence attests to the node and sends a “joined” message to the node. 
So, only nodes with an expected/genuine platform are allowed to join the trusted 
storage system. 
 3.4 Data Storage in the Trusted Storage System 
           
Figure 3.3: Data Storage in the Trusted Storage System. 
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Notations 
UK: User Key 
Uid: User ID 
nU: Nonce of the user 
nTTPN: Nonce of the TTPN 
nN: Nonce of the node 
SK: One time session key 
pub(TTPN): Public key of the TTPN 
pri(TTPN): Private key of the TTPN 
pub(N): Public key of the node 
pri(N): Private key of the node 
{files}SK: User’s/client’s files encrypted with the session key 
Nid: Node ID 
 
Protocol 2 
Message 1: {“Data Send Req”, UK ,Uid, nU } pub(TTPN)  
Message 2: {{ SK, nU, nTTPN }UK, {H(nU)}pri(TTPN)} 
Message 3: {{files}SK, {H({files} SK), nTTPN} pub(TTPN)} 
Message 4: {Message 3, (H(Message 3))pri(N), {nN, Nid} pub(TTPN)} 
Message 5: {{files}SK, {{nN, UK , Uid, SK, H({files}SK) } pub(N)} pri(TTPN)} 
Message 6: {“Data Stored”}UK  
 
The client/user sends a “data send request” (message 1) to the front-end server (FES) of 
the cloud to store his data in the cloud. The front-end server forwards the message to 
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the TTPN. The user generates a symmetric encryption key, UK, called user key, to use it 
in further communications with the cloud. Message 1 includes the user key, user ID, Uid, 
and the user nonce, nU, used for preventing replay attacks. The message is encrypted 
with the public key of the TTPN so that only the TTPN can decrypt and view the 
message. 
In return, the TTPN sends message 2 to the client via the front-end server. The TTPN 
creates a one-time session key, SK, so that the client can encrypt his data with it. This 
session key is used only for that user session and will not be used again. The TTPN 
includes its nonce in the message, nTTPN, along with the nonce of the user, nU, which it 
received. The TTPN encrypts the session key and the nonces with the user key UK so 
that only the user can decrypt the message with UK. It signs the hash of the user’s 
nonce, H(nU), with its private key pri(TTPN) to prove the user that the message is 
prepared only by the TTPN and is not tampered by an attacker.  
When the user receives message 2, it decrypts the message with his key, UK, and 
retrieves the session key, SK, and the nonces. It also retrieves the hash of its nonce, 
H(nU), which is signed with the TTPN’s private key, pri(TTPN). The user decrypts the hash 
with the TTPN’s public key, pub(TTPN) and is now assured that the message is prepared 
by the TTPN only. The user then uses that session key to encrypt his files. He sends 
message 3 to the front-end server which includes the encrypted files which are being 
encrypted with the session key, SK. Message 3 also includes the hash of the encrypted 
files, H({files} SK),  and the nonce of the TTPN, nTTPN, both encrypted with the public key 
of the TTPN, pub(TTPN). 
When the front-end server receives message 3 from the client, it picks a storage server 
(node) within the cloud and forwards message 3 to that node. The node must 
authenticate itself to the TTPN before it can store the data of the client. Since the 
client’s data is encrypted with SK, the node cannot view the client’s files before it gets 
itself authenticated to the TTPN. The storage node N computes a hash of Message 3 and 
signs it with its private key, pri(N), to convey the TTPN that the message is not modified 
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and also for its authentication. The storage node prepares Message 4 and sends it to the 
TTPN for authentication. Message 4 includes message 3 sent by the user, (H(Message 
3))pri(N), the nonce of the node,  nN, to avoid replay attacks and the ID of the storage 
node, Nid. The node encrypts the nonce, nN, and the node ID, Nid, with the public key of 
the TTPN, pub(TTPN). 
When the TTPN receives message 4 from the node, it retrieves the node ID, Nid, and the 
nonce of the node, nN, by decrypting the content with its private key, pri(TTPN). It also 
retrieves message 3 and its hash, H(Message 3) signed by the node N with the private 
key of the node, pri(N). It checks for that node’s public key, pub(N), in its database. If 
the TTPN finds the public key, the TTPN concludes that the storage node N is a member 
of the trusted storage system. The TTPN decrypts the signed hash using the node’s 
public key. The TTPN computes a hash of the received message 3 and compares the 
hash with the received hash. If the hashes are the same, the TTPN is assured that the 
contents of message 3 are not modified. The TTPN decrypts message 3 using its private 
key, pri(TTPN) and retrieves its nonce, nTTPN, sent to the user in message 2 and hence 
considers this message 4 to be a fresh message. It also retrieves the hash of the 
encrypted files and the encrypted files encrypted with the one-time session key, SK. The 
TTPN computes a hash of the received files and compares it with the received hash. If 
they are not the same, the TTPN identifies that the files are modified in transit and 
hence does not authenticate the storage node. If the values are the same, the TTPN 
authenticates the node to store the user’s files. If the TTPN does not find the public key 
of the node, pub(N), in its database, it rejects the data storage request of the node and 
does not authenticate the node. 
After authentication, the TTPN prepares message 5 and sends it to the node. Message 5 
includes the nonce of the node, nN, the user key, UK, the user ID, Uid, the session key, 
SK, which is used by the user to encrypt his files and also the hash of the encrypted files 
of the user. All of this content is encrypted using the public key of the node, pub(N), so 
that only the node can decrypt the content. This content is signed by the TTPN so that 
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the node is assured that the message is prepared by the TTPN. Message 5 also contains 
the user’s files encrypted with the session key, SK. 
When the storage node N receives message 5 from the TTPN, it decrypts the message 
using the public key of the TTPN, pub(TTPN), and now trusts that the message is 
prepared by TTPN only. It decrypts the inner content of the message using its private 
key, pri(N), and retrieves its nonce, nN, the user key, UK , the user ID, Uid, the session 
key, SK, and the hash of the encrypted files. The storage node also retrieves the 
encrypted files. It computes a hash of the received files and compares it with the 
received hash. If they are not the same, the node identifies that the files are modified in 
transit. If they are the same, the node is assured that the files are not modified. The 
node then decrypts the files using the session key. It uses its encrypted file system to re-
encrypt the files with the encrypted file system’s keys. After encrypting the files, the EFS 
stores them in the disk. The EFS stores the corresponding encryption keys and the user 
key along with the user ID in the TPM. Since the encryption keys and the user key are 
stored in the TPM, they are safe. This is because the TPM encrypts these keys using its 
RSA public key whose corresponding private key is known only to the TPM.  
The node now sends message 6 (encrypted with the user key, UK) to the user via the 
front-end server. Message 6 assures the user that his data is being stored in the cloud.  
Data Integrity 
During data storage, the EFS computes a hash of the user’s data and stores it in the 
TPM. When the data is accessed by the user, the EFS computes the hash of the user’s 
data and compares it with the hash stored in the TPM. If both the hashes are equal, the 
EFS is assured that the user’s data is not modified. If the hashes are not the same, an 
integrity breach is identified. 
Correctness 
We show that a user’s data is securely transmitted to the cloud and is stored on trusted 
storage nodes only, thus, achieving confidentiality and integrity. 
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User’s data is transmitted securely and is stored only on trusted storage nodes: 
The user encrypts his data with the one-time symmetric key, SK, which is created and 
provided to the user by the TTPN which is trusted by the user. The user sends the 
encrypted data to the cloud. A storage node within the cloud can decrypt the user’s 
data, re-encrypt it with the EFS keys and store the user’s data within it only after getting 
itself authenticated by the TTPN.  
The storage node sends an authentication request to the TTPN by signing the request 
with its private key. The TTPN authenticates the storage node if it is a member of the 
trusted storage system by checking its database if it has the public key of the storage 
node. The TTPN does not authenticate the storage node in the following situations:  
1. If the storage node is not a member of the trusted storage system, i.e., if the 
public key of the storage node is not found in the database of the TTPN. 
Or 
2.  If the public key found in the database does not decrypt the signature of the 
node. This is the case when the storage node is compromised/ rebooted. 
A storage node is compromised when a malicious program is installed in the node which 
tries to access the user’s data or modify the EFS which is in the kernel, to perform 
malicious activity. The user’s data is encrypted and stored in the disk of the storage 
node at all times. It is in an unencrypted form when it is decrypted by the storage node 
for re-encryption by the EFS during data storage or for re-encryption with the user’s key 
during data access. Data decryption is done in the memory. There is a possibility that an 
attacker or a fraudulent system administrator can read the memory during data 
decryption. To achieve this, the attacker needs to install a program in the kernel to 
access the data in the memory. We assume that an attacker needs to reboot the system 
in order to install a malicious code, i.e., in order to compromise the system. 
 32                                                                              
After a system reboot, the storage node will lose its private key whose corresponding 
public key is stored in the TTPN during the execution of protocol 1. This is because, the 
private key is stored in the storage node’s memory and after a reboot, it is lost and the 
storage node cannot use the same private key in further communications with the 
TTPN. Hence, a compromised storage node cannot pose as a trusted storage node for 
data storage and so, cannot store the user’s data. After a system reboot, the storage 
node must rejoin the trusted storage system by repeating protocol 1. 
After successful authentication of the storage node, it is allowed to store the client’s 
data securely. 
Secure storage of keys 
The EFS encryption/decryption keys and the user key, UK, are stored in the TPM. The 
TPM encrypts these keys using one of its RSA public keys and the corresponding RSA 
private key is known only to the TPM. When the EFS keys or the user keys are requested 
by the storage node (kernel), the TPM checks if the current state of the platform is as 
expected and only then releases the keys to the storage node (kernel). If the current 
state of the platform is not as expected, the TPM does not release the keys.   
3.5 Data Replication 
Each storage server replicates its data onto other servers in the cloud to achieve data 
reliability. The data stored in a trusted storage server should be replicated onto other 
trusted storage servers only. That is, the data should be replicated onto storage servers 
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3.5.1 Storage node ready to accept data for replication 
 
 
Figure 3.4: Storage node ready to accept data for replication. 
 
In order to ensure that the data for replication is transferred to trusted storage servers, 
the TTPN maintains a list of trusted storage servers that are ready to accept data for 
replication. This list is called “ready node list”. The ready node list is a dynamic list which 
keeps changing when new nodes are added to it or existing nodes get deleted from it. A 
storage server which is ready to accept data for replication sends a “ready for 
replication” message to the TTPN. The TTPN checks if that server is a member of the 
trusted storage system. If it is a member, it adds that server to the ready node list. 
Notations 
pri(N): Private key of the node N 
Nid: ID of the node N   
Protocol 3 
Message 1: {“Ready for replication”, {“add to ready node list”} pri(N), Nid} 
Message 2: {“Added/ Rejected”} 
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A storage server which is ready to accept data for replication sends “ready for 
replication” message  which includes its ID and “add to ready node list” message which 
is encrypted with the private key of the node, pri(N), so that the TTPN can authenticate 
the node by decrypting it using the public key of the node, pub(N). 
When the TTPN receives message 1, checks its database if it has the public key, pub(N), 
of that node stored, i.e., it checks if that node is a member (“trusted node”) of the 
Trusted Storage System. If the TTPN finds the public key, it decrypts the “add to ready 
node list” message and thus successfully authenticates and adds the storage node to its 
ready node list. If the TPPN does not find the public key of that node or if it is not able to 
decrypt the message with the existing public key of that node, it identifies that the node 
is not a member of the trusted storage system or that the node has been rebooted and 
compromised. The TTPN will not add that node to its ready node list.  So, the ready 
node list contains trusted storage nodes only. In response to message 1, the TTPN sends 
message 2 containing “added/rejected” message. 
When a node cannot accept any more data for replication, it sends “delete from ready 
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3.5.2 Storage node sends data for replication 
 
 
      Figure 3.5: A trusted storage node sends its data for replication to other trusted                                    
                          storage nodes. 
 
A storage node N in the cloud which is going to replicate its data on other storage 
servers, should ensure that they are trusted, i.e., they are members of the trusted 
storage system, before storing data in them. The storage node N requests the TTPN to  
send a list of ready nodes that accept data for replication. Since, the ready node list 
consists of storage nodes that are trusted, the storage node N is assured that the data 
will be replicated securely. After receiving the ready node list from the TTPN, the 
storage node N sends its data to the storage nodes, (Ni, Ni+1, Ni+2,…),  in the received list. 
Notations 
Nid: ID of node N 
{(Ni, pub(Ni)), (N(i+1), pub(N(i+1))), (N(i+2), pub(N(i+2))),……..)}: Pairs of IDs and public 
keys of ready nodes. 
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Pri(TTPN): Private key of the TTPN 
EFSK: Symmetric key created and used by the encrypted file system of the storage     
            node to encrypt/decrypt the client’s data 
{files}EFSK: Client’s files/data encrypted with the encryption file system key 
Uid: User ID 
UK: User key 
 
Protocol 4 
Message 1: {“Data Replication”, Nid, nN} 
Message 2: {nN, (Ni, pub(Ni)), (N(i+1), pub(N(i+1))), (N(i+2), pub(N(i+2))),……..}pri(TTPN) 
Message 3: {{files}EFSK, {H({files}EFSK), EFSK, Uid, UK} pub(Ni)} // Note: Message 3 is sent to 
each node in the received ready node list encrypted with the ready node’s public key. 
 
Protocol 4 ensures that the data is replicated only on trusted storage nodes in the cloud.  
The storage node N prepares a “Data Replication” message that includes the node’s ID 
and nonce, nN, to prevent replay attacks. The storage node sends this message to the 
TTPN. 
When the TTPN receives message 1, it prepares a list of ready node IDs and their public 
keys, {(Ni, pub(Ni)), (N(i+1), pub(N(i+1))), (N(i+2), pub(N(i+2))),……..} and sends this list 
and the received nonce, nN, to the storage node N as message 2 which is signed with the 
TTPN’s private key, pri(TTPN), so that the node is assured that the list is being prepared 
only by the TTPN and hence, it can trust the list of ready nodes. There is a chance that 
an attacker modifies the ready node list prepared by the TTPN or creates his own list of 
malicious nodes and sends it to the storage node N. Since message 2 is signed with the 
private key of the TTPN, the list cannot be tampered or changed by any attacker.  
 37                                                                              
The node decrypts message 2 with the public key of the TTPN, pub(TTPN) and retrieves 
the ready node IDs and their public keys. The node now sends the encrypted data, that 
has to be replicated, along with the hash of the encrypted data and the encryption 
information, i.e., the key used by the EFS to encrypt/decrypt the client’s data and the 
data owner’s (user’s) information, i.e., its user ID, Uid, and the user key, UK, as message 
3 to node Ni which is ready to accept the data for replication. Message 3 is sent to each 
node in the received set. Hash of the files, EFSK, UK and Uid are encrypted with the 
public key of the node Ni, pub(Ni), so that only that node can retrieve the encrypted 
files and the other information.  
Each node Ni that receives message 3 decrypts the message with its private key, pri(Ni), 
and retrieves the hash of the encrypted files along with the encryption/decryption key 
and the user information. It also retrieves the encrypted files. The storage node Ni 
computes the hash of the received encrypted files and compares it with the received 
hash. If they are not equal, the node identifies that the files are modified and hence 
does not store the files within it. If the values are equal, the node is assured that the 
files are not modified. It stores the encrypted files in the disk. The 
encryption/decryption key and the user information are stored in the TPM securely. 
Correctness 
We show that a user’s data is replicated only on trusted storage nodes. 
The TTPN prepares a list of storage nodes which are ready to accept data for replication. 
This ready node list contains trusted nodes only. A storage node sends a request to the 
TTPN to send the ready node list to it for replicating its data. When the TTPN receives 
the request, it sends the ready node list to the storage node. There is a chance that an 
attacker modifies the ready node list prepared by the TTPN or creates his own list of 
malicious nodes and sends it to the storage node N. Since message 2 is signed with the 
private key of the TTPN, the list cannot be tampered or changed by any attacker. Hence, 
the storage node is assured that the ready node list that it receives is prepared by the 
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TTPN only. The storage node replicates its data onto the nodes in the received list. 
Hence, data is replicated on trusted storage nodes only and is secure.  
3.6 Data Access 
 
           Figure 3.6: User accesses his data.  
 
Protocol 5 explains how the user accesses his data from the cloud securely. The user 
contacts the front-end server, FES, to access his data. The FES sends the user’s request 
to a storage node which has the user’s files and the storage node securely sends the 
user files to the user. 
Notations  
Uid: User ID 
nU: nonce of the user 
files: Client’s files 
pub(N): Public key of the storage node N 
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pri(N): Private key of the storage node N 
UK: User key 
Protocol 5 
Message 1: {“Access Data”, {nU, file name/set of file names} UK, Uid} 
Message 2: {{files, nU, pub(N)} UK , (nU+1) pri(N)} 
The user accesses his data stored in the cloud by sending the file name or a set of file 
names it needs to access and the user’s nonce, nU, and the user ID to the front-end 
server (FES) in message 1. The user encrypts the nonce and the file names with its key, 
UK, to get itself authenticated by the cloud so that the cloud does not send the 
requested files to someone else.  
When the front-end server, FES, receives message 1 from the user, it picks a storage 
node N from its directory which has information about where each user’s files are 
stored, and forwards the user’s request (message 1) to that storage node. The storage 
node N checks if it has the file/set of files stored in it. If it has the files, the encrypted file 
system (EFS) of that node should decrypt the files with its keys which are stored in the 
TPM. The storage node contacts the TPM for the respective keys. The TPM passes on 
the keys to the kernel of the node for decryption if the current state of the platform is as 
expected, i.e., if the measurement list of the current platform is same as the PCR values 
stored in the TPM. 
 After decryption of files, the node re-encrypts the files, the received user nonce, nU, and 
the public key of the node, pub(N), with the user key, UK, to achieve data 
confidentiality. The storage node also signs (nU+1) to assure the user that the message is 
prepared by the storage node only.  These two contents are sent in message 2 to the 
user. 
When the user receives message 2, it decrypts {files, nU, pub(N)}UK  using its key, UK, and 
hence retrieves its files securely. It checks whether the received nonce matches its 
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nonce. If it matches, the user deems the message to be fresh. The user key, UK, should 
not be compromised at any time.  
The user uses the public key of the node, pub(N), to decrypt the signature of the node, 
(nU+1) pri(N). After successfully decrypting the signature, the node is assured that the 
message is prepared by the storage node only. 
Correctness 
We show that the protocol allows secure data access by a user. 
A user U requests the cloud to access his data by encrypting the required file name/ set 
of file names with his user key, UK. When a user U sends a request to access his data, 
the storage node encrypts the user’s data with the user’s key, UK, and sends the 
encrypted data to the user. UK is known only to the user, TTPN and the trusted storage 
nodes. So the data is securely accessed by the user. The signature, (nU+1)pri(N), assures 
the user that the message is prepared by the storage node only. The user nonce in the 
messages ensures that the message received by the user is fresh. 
When some other user of the cloud, U’, requests the cloud to access data of user U, the 
storage node sends the data to U’ (encrypted with the user key of U’) only when the 
storage node finds the ID of user U’ in the access control list of the data. So, a user’s 
data is accessed by those users of the cloud to whom the user has given access privilege.  
Nonces are being used in messages of all the protocols to prevent replay attacks. So, 
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Chapter 4: Conclusions 
 
Currently, organizations and individual users are not coming forward confidently to use 
the cloud service for data storage though it is a cost-effective service. The main reason 
for this is that the cloud is a system maintained by a third party and hence it cannot be 
trusted. Data security is the main challenging issue in cloud computing since all 
communications with the cloud are done through internet which is prone to attacks. We 
consider the confidentiality and integrity problems of client’s data stored in the cloud. In 
this thesis, a framework for trusted storage of client’s data within the cloud is 
developed. The framework provides data security against the system administrator who 
has the maximum number of privileges on a storage node. The system uses a Trusted 
Platform Module (TPM) chip in each storage node which provides protected storage of 
encryption/decryption keys of client’s data and remote attestation of each storage 
node. Each storage server has an encrypted file system which encrypts the client’s data 
and the corresponding keys are stored in the TPM. Cryptographic techniques are used to 
provide secure communication between the client and the cloud. The system ensures 
that the client’s data is stored only on trusted storage servers and it cannot be 
transferred by malicious system administrators to some corrupt node. The system 
architecture and the proposed protocols together form a Trusted Storage System for 
Cloud. The system achieves confidentiality and integrity of the client’s data stored in the 
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